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Abstract 
The first eurosceptic ideas were articulated in Lithuania during the European Union accession referendum 
campaign in 2003, but they were almost inaudible through the chorus of pro-European voices. Different kinds 
of eurosceptic arguments were expressed, such as a fear of identity loss or critics of the government ―buying 
votes‖. However, there were just a few political actors expressing these views, and the relevant political 
parties were absent among this group. This situation was in contrast to the neighboring countries with more 
serious eurosceptics. Ten years have passed and situation is changing. Eurosceptic ideas still lack popularity 
in Lithuanian political parties and among non-partisan actors, but some initiatives of eurosceptic movements 
receive popular support. Who represents the eurosceptics in Lithuania? Which of their arguments are 
increasingly cogent, if any? Why are these ideas popular or unpopular in Lithuania? To answer these 
questions, deeper analysis of the situation and reasons for euroscepticism in Lithuania is needed. With the 
above-mentioned questions in mind, the article concentrates on the euroscepticism debates in Lithuania 
among different groups and actors of society—e.g. political actors, and public and social movements – by 
discussing the main ideas of Lithuanian eurosceptics, and the reasons for their (un-)popularity. The article 
classifies Lithuanian euroscepticism both in terms of ideas and actors. Media monitoring, interviews with 
particular actors, public opinion and electoral data are the main research sources used for analysis. The 
article reveals that throughout the entire decade of Lithuania‘s membership in EU the Lithuanian 
eurosceptics remained on the margins of politics; but, nevertheless, they have the potential to grow in 
number of supporters. 
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1. Introduction 
Already ten years have passed since the European Union (EU) accession referendum in Lithuania. 
During the referendum campaign in 2003 organizers had doubts about whether Lithuanians would come 
and vote.  
 
“Lithuanian political elites awaited the referendum results with great anxiety”  
(Mažylis and Unikaitė, 2004: 48-49).  
 
 
However, Lithuania held a successful referendum and became the most euro-enthusiastic country 
among the nine candidate countries, with a turnout of 63.37%; 91% of those who cast their votes voted 
―yes‖; this was 57% of the entire electorate (Republic of Lithuania Central Electoral Committee, 2003). The 
first eurosceptic ideas and arguments (e.g. ―the decline of the nation state‖, ―less independence‖ or ―selling 
the country to the Brussels‖)1 were not attractive to the general society or were not visible in the media due 
to a weak eurosceptic campaign and poor coverage of eurosceptic ideas in media. 
There were expectations that over time European integration would foster greater discussion of EU 
matters and that skepticism would increase in Lithuanian society. However, the opposite situation arose. 
Contrary to expectations, Euro-optimism dominated the entire decade since the referendum. The 
parliamentary mainstream Lithuanian political parties (whether on the left or the right of the ideological 
spectrum) actively promoted EU integration and support for the EU project. The political parties openly 
declaring their eurosceptic positions remained on the margins of politics, finding little support among 
Lithuanian voters. This situation is not an exception, because, as Ralph Negrine, Vaclav Stetka and Marta 
Fialová note,  
 
“in Western Europe, strong opposition towards the integration process is largely confined to the fringe parties on both 
sides of the political spectrum, while the mainstream parties – with the exception of the British Conservative Party – are 
generally characterized by a pro-European orientation”                                                                                
 (2011: 75) 
 
 
Consequently there were no major discussions on euroscepticism, or they were rare and went 
unnoticed in Lithuanian media due to the weak organization of eurosceptics and low media interest in these 
issues. 
Notwithstanding all the problems incurred by Lithuania (e.g. unemployment, energy issues such as 
high prices, distrust in the state institutions and legal system, etc.), Lithuanian public opinion polls indicate 
that the population‘s attitude towards the European Union throughout the past decade remained favorable. 
A majority of Lithuanian residents are convinced that EU membership is beneficial for their country, and 
perspectives for the EU‗s future are optimistic (Eurobarometer 72, 2009: 3). The pro–European attitudes of 
the Lithuanian citizens and mainstream political parties encouraged the Lithuanian academic community to 
believe that euroscepticism is disappearing from the main political discourses and does not have the 
potential to be as popular as it is in some Western European countries. However, the Lithuanian 
Presidency of the EU Council in 2013 (from the 1st of July to the end of December) brought with it some 
                                                     
1 The arguments are presented from the TV media monitoring data on EU accession referendum  campaign collected by 
Vytautas Magnus University researchers (L. Mažylis, I. Unikaitė and political science students)  in 2003 (unpublished data). 
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changes: EU matters in the Lithuanian media became more visible; and, the activity of eurosceptics 
increased as well (Peteris, 2013). The eurosceptic movements and politicians started actively participating 
in public discussions and promoting some of their initiatives.  
The first important initiative of various nationalist movements expressing eurosceptic ideas, 
together with the Farmers Union, was presented in early autumn of 2013 when the process of the collection 
of signatures supporting the Referendum on the sale of land to foreigners started. The initiative was 
strongly supported by Lithuanians and more than 300,000 signatures for the implementation of the 
referendum were collected for the first time in Lithuania. This success boosted confidence, and group 
initiating the referendum against the sale of land to foreigners also planned to ask the nation whether it 
supports the introduction of the euro is planned for 2015. The aforementioned events show that 
marginalized eurosceptics are trying to start active public discussions on the EU integration process.  
Who represents the eurosceptics in Lithuania? What are the main ideas supported by 
eurosceptics? Why are these ideas popular/unpopular in Lithuania? This article discusses these questions 
by concentrating on the euroscepticism debates in Lithuania among various groups and actors of society—
e.g. political actors, social movements, and the general public. The article seeks to categorize these actors 
and their ideas according to the euroscepticism typologies proposed by many well-known researchers 
(Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2001, 2002; Kopecky and Mudde; 2002; Spiering 2004), and provides an answer 
to whether eurosceptic ideas have the potential to gain greater popularity in Lithuania. 
Media monitoring, interviews with particular actors, public opinion polls and electoral data are the 
main research sources used for the analysis and conceptualization of euroscepticism in Lithuania. First, the 
definition and typologies of euroscepticism are discussed by presenting a framework for analysis of 
euroscepticism in Lithuania. Second, the research methods are presented. Third, data on Lithuanian public 
opinion is analyzed. Fourth, the main eurosceptic political and non-political actors, their ideas and modes of 
activity are analyzed. Finally, the possible reasons for the popularity or unpopularity of eurosceptic ideas 
are discussed.  
 
 
2. Euroscepticism Definition and Typologies: An Overview 
As Robert Harmsen and Menno Spiering write, 
 
 “though initially cultivated in English soil, the term Euroscepticism has progressively taken root elsewhere” (2004: 15) 
 
 
All euroscepticisms which are formed in various countries  
 
“are marked by a doubt or an opposition as regards the particular political forms which have been assumed by 
European integration”  
(Harmsen Spiering, 2004:18) 
 
 
Euroscepticism is formed from the different visions of EU integration and differing evaluation of EU 
development. Euroscepticism might be not only opposition to the EU as a supranational organization but 
also a critique of some developments, integration processes, policies etc. In fact, there is no single, 
universally accepted usage of the term ‗Euroscepticism‘. As Sofia Vasilopoulou notes,  
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“its connotations change depending on the political climate, the person that uses the term as well as the country that it 
is used in”  
(2008: 3) 
 
 
For instance, in some countries all nationalist parties and movements are assumed to be 
eurosceptic, but in other countries nationalist views are not associated with euroscepticism. Secondary 
literature and various attempts to provide typologies of euroscepticism also reflect that the term 
Euroscepticism is rather vague. 
The most researched version is party–based euroscepticism. Paul Taggart provided the first 
definition of euroscepticism by discussing euroscepticism in Western European party systems. He 
described euroscepticism as ―the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright 
and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration‖ (Taggart, 1998: 366).  
Later this definition was detailed by Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak when they introduced one 
of the typologies of euroscepticism. They distinguish between ‗hard‘ and ‗soft‘ forms of euroscepticism. 
According to them, hard Euroscepticism is a situation ―where there is a principled opposition to the EU and 
European integration‖ (Taggart and Scerbiak, 2002: 7). The political actors representing this type of 
euroscepticism may directly express opposition to membership or even call for withdrawal from the EU. 
Later the researchers modified the definition by making it more concrete and argued that hard eurosceptics 
express ―principled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, 
based on the ceding or transfer of powers to supranational institution such as the EU‖ (Szczerbiak and 
Taggart, 2003: 12). Hard euroscepticism is typically associated with movements that are on the margins of 
national party systems. The harder forms of euroscepticism may be understood in terms of strategic or 
ideological reactions to the ‗pro-European‟ orientation of the governing „cartel‘ and hard liners usually like to 
express opposition to the mainstream parties through the manifestation of euroscepticism. 
Accordingly, soft Euroscepticism is a situation ―where there is not a principled objection to 
European integration or EU membership but there is opposition to the EU's current or future planned 
trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to make‖ (Taggart and 
Szcerbiak, 2003: 6, Taggart and Szcerbiak, 2008).  
This distinction between the two types of euroscepticism is valuable because it is easier to 
operationalize these types in individual case studies. However, there may also be difficulties in 
operationalization due to the breadth of the definition, especially when analyzing soft euroscepticism. For 
example, at points it appears that every critique of EU policy might be considered soft euroscepticism. 
Additionally, there is difficulty in differentiating ‗hard‘ from ‗soft‘ euroscepticism when referring to the part of 
the definition related to the sharing of powers between national institutions and the EU. Both definitions 
address this, but one stresses the extension of competencies (soft) and the other emphasizes the ceding of 
rights (hard). It is occasionally very difficult to capture this difference in eurosceptic argumentation. 
The aforementioned authors also note that:  
 
―any account of the levels of Euroscepticism must take account of three components: (1) levels of public 
Euroscepticism; (2) party-based Euroscepticism; and (3) Eurosceptical policy outcomes. Only when there are citizens, 
parties and policies that are Eurosceptical will Euroscepticism become a realized force in European politics.‖  
(Taggart and Scerbiak, 2002: 9).  
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Thus, they argue that analysis of euroscepticism in various societies shall pay attention not only to 
the parties‘ positions, but also to public opinion as well as to the policies of national governments. This is 
important for analyzing separate cases because it helps to capture the general eurosceptic views of a 
society. 
Kopecký and Mudde present a different typology of euroscepticism by arguing that the first 
typology is not concrete enough. They distinguish between specific supports for the European Union on the 
one hand and diffuse support for European integration in general on the other (Kopecký and Mudde, 2002). 
The authors try to analyze euroscepticism along an EU pessimist/optimist axis and a Europhobe/Europhile 
axis. As Harmsen and Spiering state:  
 
“Euroenthusiasts are those who are both supportive of the broad project of European integration and optimistic as 
regards the actual trajectory of the European Union‟s development. Europragmatists are not supportive of the broad 
project of European integration, but nevertheless are positive about the current EU insofar as it is serves particular 
national interests. Eurosceptics, conversely, hold a positive view of the broad project of European integration, but are 
critical of the actual development of the EU. Finally, Eurorejects reject both the general idea of European integration 
and the specific form which it has taken in the European Union” 
(2004:19) 
  
 
In this explanation of euroscepticism the term eurosceptic itself has a more restricted scope than in 
most other common usage, referring only to a specific category of critics of the European Union. The 
general model of the four ideal types of euroscepticism is more detailed than the first one and is supposed 
to be applicable to qualitative analyses of parties‘ views.  
Sofia Vasilopoulou proposes a third classification of euroscepticism. She talks about three 
categories of euroscepticism: rejecting euroscepticism (according to the position that “all policies must be 
managed solely at the national level and member states must withdraw from the EU at any cost‖ 
(Vasilopolou, 2008: 6)), conditional euroscepticism (“the party is not against the principle of cooperation but 
against its practice and its future” (Vasilopoulou, 2008: 6)), and compromising euroscepticism (―a party 
accepts both the principle and the practice of integration but rejects future cooperation‖ (Vasilopoulou, 
2008: 6)). According to Vasilopoulou: 
 
“The demarcation line between „rejecting‟ and „conditional‟ Eurosceptics lies in the issue of EU withdrawal. <<….>> 
The parties that choose to adopt the „rejecting‟ type of Euroscepticism “are fervent opponents of supranationalism and 
ceding one‟s national sovereignty to the benefit of European institutions” <<….>> ”The „conditional‟ Eurosceptics 
significantly differ from the „compromising‟ Eurosceptics because they do not accept that the EU is the desirable 
framework for European integration. The „compromising‟ Eurosceptics differ from the other two types in that they 
accept to work within the existing EU structures. All three types of Euroscepticism reject transferring further decision-
making power to Europe and they are fervent opponents of a federal Europe.” 
(2008: 7) 
 
 
This third classification is based on the three facets of European integration (principle, practice and 
future) and the issue of sovereignty. This typology of euroscepticism has the potential to be useful for 
analysis because it allows an analysis of euroscepticism with more analytical precision and clarity when 
assessing a party‘s position on Europe. Two variables used in the classification are described in detail and 
the three facets of EU integration have the potential to reveal significant qualitative differences between 
eurosceptic political actors. 
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In this paper, the term eurosceptic is used in its broader understanding and analyzes the 
Lithuanian case of euroscepticism generally according to the typology presented by Taggart and Szcerbiak. 
Their theoretical definitions and types of euroscepticism will be used as the basis for case analysis. 
However, the second typology as well as the third one will be applied in the analysis of social movements 
and parties‘ euroscepticism arguments and views. 
 
 
3. Research Framework and Methods 
The following Lithuanian case analysis is based on a discussion of three euroscepticism 
components: public euroscepticism, party-based euroscepticism and social movement-based 
euroscepticism. In order to be able to explain which type of euroscepticism is prevailing in Lithuania and 
whether that euroscepticism will have a tendency to increase in the future, all the actors will be analyzed 
according to their support or opposition to the EU project and policies by paying attention to how they 
express their ideas and activities, and what changes in their expression of euroscepticism. The policies of 
the Lithuanian government will not be analyzed, as this fall outside the limited scope of this article. 
The empirical analysis is not aimed at a new conceptualization or the proposal of a new typology; 
instead it aims to understand the situation of euroscepticism in Lithuanian society and why and in which 
circumstances Lithuanians tend to be euro-optimists or in which circumstances eurosceptics. 
The article uses the results of research based on qualitative methodologies. Qualitative research 
was conducted that sought to identify the trend and the dominant types of euroscepticism among the 
parties and social movements. The basic methods are qualitative interviews and analysis of the documents, 
concentrating on the programs and other information provided at the websites of social movements. 
The qualitative semi-structured interviews were performed with representatives of social 
movements, according to a prepared questionnaire, during the period of 2012-2013. The representatives 
were chosen according to the eurosceptic positions they expressed in the media. Some of the interviews 
were conducted by the author of the article (1), others by a student (3), and one interview was found on an 
internet website. In total, the data from five interviews is used for the analysis here. The duration of the 
interviews varies from 32 minutes to 50 minutes. The informants were asked about their views towards the 
EU and its future, whether they call themselves eurosceptics, what methods and measures they use for the 
expression and propagation of their ideas, and why they have skeptical positions and what ideas about the 
future of EU integration they have. 
Document analysis was performed before the interviews, with the aim of identifying eurosceptic 
movements and being able to identify the official position of the movements and parties. A number of 
documents were analyzed, including programs, articles, and opinion expressions posted on the websites of 
movements. 
Quantitative data is used for public opinion analysis of euroscepticism and for the analysis of the 
results of elections. Data from Eurobarometer surveys and from the Election results data base is used. 
Seeking to ascertain the changes in public opinion towards the EU and its policies, descriptive statistical 
analysis of frequencies is used.  
 
 
4. Lithuanian Public Euroscepticism 
As previously noted, Lithuanian citizens were very active in supporting Lithuania‘s membership in 
the EU during the accession referendum. How has the situation changed during the ten year periods since 
membership?  
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As opinion polls conducted by the Lithuanian public opinion research center Vimorus indicate, the 
positive view of Lithuanian membership in the EU is stable and has only three insignificant peaks with 5-6 
percentages of growth from average: the first in October, 2004 (82%), the second in July, 2007 (75%) and 
the third in November, 2008 (75%). From the last peak in 2008, support for EU membership among the 
residents of Lithuania has had the tendency towards slight decrease. (See Diagram1, which presents the 
opinion trends in detail.)  
 
 
Diagram1. Opinion on the Lithuanian Membership in the European Union, 2004-2012. 
 
         Source: Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs2 
 
 
The group of Lithuanian residents opposing Lithuanian membership in the EU tends to be stable, 
with an average of about 16-17%. The smallest group against membership was in October 2004 – 8% (it 
overlapped with the biggest group of optimists—82%). The respondents from the last two years who were 
opposing the membership vary from 18% to 20% (see Diagram1). 
The other indicators for the evaluation of Lithuanian public euro-optimism and euroscepticism 
come from the data provided by the Standart Eurobarometer surveys. Seeking to assess the changes in 
the views of society about the EU, two closely related questions are used from the Eurobarometer poll. The 
                                                     
2
 Information provided by the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the website: http://www.euro.lt/en/lithuanias-membership-
in-the-eu/lithuanian-public-opinion/ 
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first question asks whether the respondent thinks that their country‘s membership in the EU is ‗a good thing‘ 
or ‗a bad thing‘. The analysis uses the figures for ‗a bad thing‘ as indicating euroscepticism, and figures for 
‗a good thing‘ as indicating euro-optimism. However, in the reports of the poll the data for this question is 
provided only until 2011. For this reason calculating an average for the whole period is impossible. For the 
period from 2004-2013, as an indicator of the Lithuanian people‘s view towards the EU, the analysis applies 
the second question, which asks how much a person trusts in certain institutions (i.e. the European Union 
as a group of institutions). The answers are from ―tend to trust‖ to ―don‟t know‖.  
Based on the findings of the Eurobarometer survey 2005, most residents of Lithuania were 
satisfied with the first year of EU membership; attitudes towards the EU have become slightly more rational 
during the year, as the enthusiasm has started to subside. If the first half of the year of membership was 
marked by optimism, the second showed a more rational outlook. That is understandable. Information 
provided by the mass media has become more diverse compared with that which was available prior to EU 
accession. Lithuania‘s EU membership did not result in a miracle, and the euphoria should subside. The 
degree of conviction that EU membership is useful remained high in Lithuania: from 69% (2004) to 57% 
(2005). In the period from 2004 to 2011 the answer ―good thing‖ was changing from 69% to 49%, with 
some fluctuations (see Diagram2). The optimism started to drop with the beginning of economic crisis in 
2008 in Lithuania and some other EU countries. 
 
 
Diagram2.Lithuanian Opinion on the Benefit of EU Membership 
Q: “Do you think that your country‟s membership in the EU is „a good thing‟ or „a bad thing‟?” 
 
 
                  Source: prepared by the author3  
 
 
                                                     
3
 According to the Standart Eurobarometer data (2004-2011) // http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/index_en.cfm 
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During the period of 2004-2011 Lithuania remained among the most optimistic countries. The 
number of pessimists was rather stable, changing from 6% to 16% (Eurobarometer, 2004-2011). This 
indicates that Lithuania had a small group of people who were skeptical about EU membership and its 
benefits for society. However, this group was not active in the public space and was not well organized in 
expressing their opinions. It tended to be passive according to participation in political activities.  
Diagram 2 shows that the group of respondents who indicated that Lithuania‘s EU membership is 
neither good nor bad tended to grow, from 22 to 31%. The optimism is likely to change to a lack of 
judgment or uncertainty about the EU membership benefits. The undecided people may be potential 
supporters of both the eurosceptic and euro-optimist groups. 
According to Diagram 3, in the period from 2004 to 2014 more than half of Lithuanian residents 
(from 47% to 69%) answered that they tend to trust EU institutions (Eurobarometer 2004-2014). The 
number of those who do not trust EU institutions ranged from 15% to 39%. These results do not show a 
great deal of skepticism. Trust in EU institutions is even stronger in Lithuania than the average among all 
EU countries (it varied from 42% in 2010 to 33% in 2013). Moreover, the numbers from the last two years 
indicate that Lithuanians‘ trust in the European Union is growing while distrust is decreasing. This might be 
associated with the increase of information about the activities of EU institutions. 
 
 
Diagram3. Trust in EU institutions in Lithuania.  
Q: “I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions (The European Union)” 
 
 
                Source: prepared by the author4 
 
 
                                                     
4
 According to the Standart Eurobarometer data (2004-2014) // 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_line.cfm?keyID=2193&nationID=21,&startdate=2004.10&enddate=2014.06 
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An additional indicator of public attitude towards the EU and integration processes is the question 
about support for EURO. Membership in the eurozone is not merely an economic decision. Lithuanians 
associate this membership with deeper integration and loss of sovereignty. That is why this question might 
be used as an indirect measure of euroscepticism reflecting the type of euroscepticism associated with a 
view on future EU integration processes. At the beginning of Lithuania‘s membership in the EU the 
common currency Euro was very positively evaluated by Lithuanians (69% of respondents agreed that the 
Euro is a good thing, see Diagram4). The last 2013 Eurobarometer results show that only 40% of 
Lithuanians positively evaluate the Euro (by comparison, 51% of all citizens of the EU member states have 
a positive opinion of the Euro, and 62% of eurozone residents also have a positive opinion of the Euro 
(Standart Eurobarometer 80, 2013)). This indicator shows an increase in euroscepticism related to deeper 
integration among the Lithuanian respondents. The majority of Lithuanians is satisfied with the current 
status quo of the EU, but is likely to reject deeper future integration. 
 
 
Diagram4. Attitude toward the European Economic and Monetary Union with one single currency, the Euro. 
Q: “Please, tell me whether you agree or not with one of these statements: the European Economic and 
Monetary Union with one single currency, the euro‖ (The percentages of respondents agreeing with the statement). 
 
 
     Source: Prepared by the author5 
 
 
In measuring Lithuanian public levels of euroscepticism we note that Lithuanians do not look at the 
EU as a bad thing. Instead they agree that membership in the EU brings many benefits for the country 
(especially for those who receive subsidies (e.g. farmers), for people getting support for the activities from 
EU funds, etc.). Nevertheless, this optimistic view disappears when we evaluate different spheres and 
issues separately. The EU institutions are trusted more than national institutions, but people tend not to 
trust the Euro as a symbol of deeper integration. National currency is treated as a symbol of sovereignty. 
                                                     
5 According to the Standart Eurobarometer 80 data: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb80/eb80_lt_lt_nat.pdf 
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Taking into account the euroscepticism types described by Taggart and Szczerbiak, we can 
observe that Lithuanian public euroscepticism is not strong but it exists, and might be called soft 
euroscepticism. Lithuanians are likely to oppose the EU's extension of competencies that the EU is 
planning to make (e.g. the case of the introduction of Euro in Lithuania in 2015), but they have a generally 
positive view of the EU. If we evaluate Lithuanian citizens‘ views according to the second typology 
proposed by Kopecký and C. Mudde, we identify that Lithuanians tend to be europragmatists, generally 
accepting the policies of the EU but having reservations and suspicion towards future integration. 
According to the third classification, Lithuanian citizens might be called compromising eurosceptics, who 
think that ―European integration is not necessarily a good thing but some aspects of it are beneficial to the 
nation state. Transferring national decision-making power to European institutions is particularly 
unattractive‖ (Vasilopolou, 2008: 6). 
How does this soft euroscepticism and pragmatism of population coincide with the support for the 
parties that declare some eurosceptic ideas? The next part of the article provides an answer to this 
question.  
 
 
5. Eurosceptic Political Parties in Lithuania 
There were no hard eurosceptic parties in Lithuania from the beginning of the discussions about 
the possible membership of Lithuania in the EU. No one from the political parties was against EU 
membership. However, party-based euroscepticism was slowly becoming established as part of the 
Lithuanian party system. In the elections to the Lithuanian parliament (Seimas), two soft eurosceptic parties 
were identified: The Centre Union of Lithuania (which received 2.86% of the vote in 2000) and The 
Lithuanian Peasants Party (which received 4.08% of the vote in 2000). Both parties were small (in terms of 
electoral support and membership). Having no strong popular support these parties were not very active 
and visible during the campaign for the EU Accession referendum, which was dominated by positive and 
optimistic views and opinions. The aforementioned parties and their leaders were critical of the EU, which 
they argued takes power away from national governments and poses a threat to national sovereignty 
(Ozolas, 2010). However, Lithuanian citizens‘ optimism and economic hopes were stronger than the 
perceived threat of losing sovereignty. 
During the elections to the parliament in 2004 the parties expressing some soft euroscepticism 
were again not supported by the voters. In fact, the support decreased. The parties which could have been 
considered soft eurosceptics had small membership, and their ideological orientation and rhetoric was 
essentially nationalistic. Thus, these parties received a small percentage of the votes: National Centre 
Party  received 0,5% of the votes (they had no statements against the EU; they merely expressed indirect 
skepticism regarding the requirement that the EU constitution should be approved by a referendum of the 
people6); the Republican party received 0,36% of the votes (they had very nationalistic rhetoric with 
statements against the land sale for foreigners, against the industrial objects sale for foreigners and a 
statement that the party is against the Lithuanian membership in the EU—in other words, rhetoric of hard 
euroscepticism); the Lithuanian nationalists union received 0,21% of the votes (the party supports EU 
membership, but declares that it is against federation creation in the EU and thus losing Lithuania‘s status 
as a state). Altogether, eurosceptic parties expressing conditional euroscepticism received approximately 
1% of the vote. One of the major reasons for this decrease of eurosceptic parties‘ support is Lithuania‘s 
                                                     
6 The Eurosceptic arguments of the parties were found in their election manifestos which were presented in the website of 
Republic of Lithuania Central Electoral Committee. 
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membership in the EU and the optimistic referendum campaign which was filled with positive arguments 
with hopes and promises. After the enthusiastic referendum campaign and active positive voting people 
were still full of hope during the Parliamentary elections. Thus, again, the Lithuanian political party system 
was dominated by strong euro-optimistic parties. 
The 2008 Lithuanian Parliamentary elections were also not very different from the previous 
parliamentary elections. The campaign was dominated by national issues but with the positive influence of 
EU membership on these issues and benefits of membership. However, eurosceptic parties had a little bit 
higher support than in previous elections: The Center Party received 0.7% of the votes (in discourse they 
expressed soft euroscepticism by talking about the need to protect the country from EU influence and 
providing critique of some EU policies)7; The Party “Young Lithuania” received 1.75% of the votes (they 
declared the need to protect the nation from foreign influence and conniving strategies from the west). The 
two parties received about 2% of the votes. No one from the dominant and most relevant parties changed 
their positions, and their discourses were dominated by euro-optimistic ideas. 
The 2012 parliamentary elections had a greater number of small parties participating in the 
elections. These elections were the first parliamentary elections when some eurosceptic ideas appeared in 
the discussions. Again some of the small parties expressed soft Euroscepticism. The Republican Party 
made no statement directly against membership in EU, but it stated that it is necessary to fight against 
wrong and discriminatory policies of the EU, such as unequal subsidies for the farmers, etc. The leader of 
the party repeated these ideas in his statements expressing concern on the plans of deaper EU 
integration 8 . Using euroreject rhetoric, the party changed its rhetoric to eurosceptic and conditional 
euroscepticism. This party received 0.27% of the votes. The coalition “For Lithuania in Lithuania”, which 
united some nationalistic parties such as the Lithuanian Center party, Lithuanian nationalists union and the 
Lithuanian social democratic union, received 0,94% of the votes. This coalition expressed indirect 
euroscepticism by saying that it is going to fight against the propaganda of depravity (e.g. the issues of 
LGBT rights and parades associated with EU policies) and against the land sale for foreigners, etc. This 
rhetoric was similar to the Republican Party rhetoric and might be identified as eurosceptic according to the 
second classification and conditional euroscepticism, according to the third classification of euroscepticism. 
Lithuanian peasants and Green Union was also skeptical about some EU policies – e.g. it was against the 
land sale for foreigners. They received 3,88% of the votes. Altogether soft eurosceptic parties received 
around 5% of the votes. This shows some increase in support of euroscepticism, but mainly due to some 
ideas of the peasants‘ party, which is supported in some regions in Lithuania mainly by the farmers who 
started worrying about the land sale to the foreigners and felt a threat of losing the possibility to buy land at 
cheaper prices. Thus this euroscepticism is linked not to nationalist concerns about sovereignty but mainly 
to economic interests. 
It is important to note that among the bigger parties which receive significant support from voters 
was one party, ―Order and Justice‖ (7.31% of the votes and 11 seats in 2012), which expressed some 
euroscepticism related to national sovereignty in the campaigning period. The leaders of the party 
supported the idea of referendum on the introduction of Euro in Lithuania, argued that the party stands 
against the discriminatory policies of the EU towards the farmers subsidies. 9  Their ideas about the 
                                                     
7 For the analysis of Parties Euroscepticism the election programs were analyzed. All the programs in Lithuanian are available at 
the website of Electoral Commission: www.vrk.lt  
8 The statements of  Valdemaras Valkiūnas are available at the website of The Republican Party: 
http://www.respublikonupartija.lt/naujienos?start=15  
9 The texts of the speaches of party „Oder and Justice― leaders are available at the party‗s website: 
http://www.tvarka.lt/index.php?id=6980  
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necessity of reform in the EU (the necessity to strengthen the model of EU confederation instead of 
centralization and federalization of EU) might be called compromising euroscepticism. We may note that 
some parliamentary parties are ready to change their stances and use eurosceptic ideas in order to secure 
greater numbers of supporters. The rational voters are likely to vote for the more relevant parties presenting 
some euroscepticism instead of voting for the small parties that openly declare themselves eurosceptics. 
If we compare the public opinion results presented in the previous section with the election results 
presented in this section it is clear that the level of public euroscepticism does not coincide with the support 
for the parties expressing euroscepticism. In the case of Lithuania we see that the public level of 
euroscepticism is not minimal, but the level of support for the parties expressing some soft euroscepticism 
is rather minimal. The first reason for this situation might be the low level of salience of the European 
issues in the national campaigning, as well in the media and political discourses. Even European 
Parliament elections are dominated usually by nationalissues in Lithuania. Political parties and politicians 
prefer to discuss the same issues of domestic policy as they discuss in national parliamentary or municipal 
elections (e.g. they promise to make salaries the same as the EU average for the people working in the 
sectors of education and culture; reduce taxes, attract investments, etc.)10. Therefore, there is no need for 
parties to harden their eurosceptic stance in order to be more visible. Only small Lithuanian nationalist and 
populist parties which are at the extreme political right have an ideological stance that makes it easier for 
them to use eurosceptic discourse than other mainstream parliamentary parties. These parties have no 
opportunity to enter the parliament in the multi-district. By using some eurosceptic and populist rhetoric they 
try to differentiate themselves from the political mainstream. In this way they try to unite those voters who 
are unsatisfied by mainstream politics. From this we may conclude that party euroscepticism tends to be 
marginalized in the Lithuanian political party system. Major parties are not likely to use eurosceptic rhetoric. 
Accordingly, small parties are not popular and have no chance to be represented in major national 
institutions (e.g. parliament, municipal councils). 
Although we can note the marginalization of euroscepticism among Lithuanian parties, we cannot 
say the same about Lithuanian social movements, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
 
6. The Eurosceptic Groups and Social Movements in Lithuania 
Taking into consideration political actors other than political parties who express some 
euroscepticism, we may distinguish a number of Lithuanian groups critical of the EU in the last years. All 
these actors became more visible in 2013 when Lithuania started the Presidency of the Council of the 
European Union. During the last year many newspaper and new media portals‘ articles were published 
discussing the issue of the EU as well as warnings about the dangers of the EU to Lithuanians. A part of 
the articles were a reaction to some events (e.g. the anniversary of the Lithuanian Independence 
movement ―Lietuvos Sajūdis) or speeches of politicians. For instance, one of the leading Lithuanian 
newspapers was discussing the words of Lithuanian minister of Foreign Affairs L. Linkevičius in September 
2013 when he said that: 
 
“it is necessary to suppress the nationalist parties by calling them radical, nationalistic combinations‖  
(Respublika, 2013) 
 
 
                                                     
10 The national issues dominated in the 2004, 2008 European Parliament elections. 
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Journalists criticized the attempts to link nationalist and eurosceptic ideas with radicals ones.  
 
 
7. Eurosceptic Groups on the Internet 
In Lithuania we can note an increase of internet sites agitating against the EU (e.g. ―We against 
(something related to EU)‖/ ―MES PRIEŠ‖ ) or ―No!‖/NE! (as an answer to something related to the EU). 
Who are these groups which are present in the media and internet? 
Among the internet eurosceptic groups we find the following types: 
Various nationalist and youth organizations which value nationalism, Lithuanian language and 
patriotism. They participate in protests and parades.  
People who thinks that the EU is a new Soviet Union. 
People who are against the euro and are for the national currency – Litas. 
Patriotic participants to forums who think that participation in the EU Parliament elections is not 
important because it is impossible to elect nationalistic powerful Lithuanians. 
Groups whose chief aim is to stop the ―Baltic Pride‖ parade and forbid all LGBT persons and 
activities. They relate this issue to European values and the EU (Peteris U., 2013). 
All these groups communicate via Facebook and usually the members of the groups have more or 
less the same marginal status. They often share links to Russian internet sites and articles which are full of 
anti-western and homophobic attitudes. The content of these group sites is hostile to the EU as an 
organization and discusses the theories of conspiracy about ―imperialistic Brussels‖. They might be called 
as Eurorejects. The aforementioned groups on the internet are not influential but communication in social 
networks may attract the attention of some people and their ideas can be spread in wider society. 
As we look at Western European euroscepticism, we can see that euroscepticism has no direct 
relationship with homophobia. Nevertheless, in Lithuania as well as in Central and Eastern European 
countries this link is visible. During the Baltic Pride parade in Vilnius in 2013 in July, among the observers 
of the parade standing along the street it was possible to see posters such as ―the EU is a union of perverts 
(―ES ―iškrypėlių‖), ―Euro-Sodoma‖, etc.  
This intensification of Euroscepticism related to the European values in Lithuania, just as in other 
countries of the region, might exist for simple reasons: such as EU requirements and pressure on human 
rights, particularly the rights of the LGBT community (Puleikytė, 2013). Homophobia has become a tool of 
euroscepticism in countries such as Lithuania. On the one hand, during the integration process of these 
countries into the EU in 2004, LGBT rights had not yet been touched and discussed separately. On the 
other hand, in the communist regime homosexuality was a strictly forbidden topic in public discourse. Such 
people "did not exist." Accordingly, LGBT rights issues escalated when EU institutions began to raise the 
requirements for Member-States on LGBT rights. The other reason that euroscepticism and homophobia 
are related is the traditional conception of the family. EU requirements for LGBT rights are automatically 
perceived as a threat to traditional family values in Lithuania. Marriage becomes an important symbol 
because the partnership links between LGBT people are often not treated as a traditional family links. 
The other reason for the intensification of euroscepticism in Lithuania is the European economic 
crisis. Its consequences were important for a large number of people. Their socioeconomic position 
worsened, and many family members had to emigrate for economic reasons. That is one reason why 
skeptical views on EU policies are not a coincidence. 
Nevertheless, the eurosceptics are active not only on the Internet websites; the Eurosceptic ideas 
are popular among the nationalistic social movements. The type of Euroscepticism which all these 
movements express is discussed in the next section. 
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8. Eurosceptic Social Movements 
There are many formal and informal Eurosceptic movements and groups in Lithuania. They might 
all be grouped into three categories. One of the soft eurosceptic groups is an intellectual elite group of 
former participants in the Lithuanian independence movement Sąjūdis. At the time of the reestablishment of 
Lithuania these people were rather influential, but due to different circumstances now they have no work, 
no important positions, and maybe even barely enough income to live with dignity. In their personal state of 
anger they expressed some disappointment with the decision of Lithuania to become a member of the EU 
and their discourse stressed the national sovereignty issue. They tend to fall between Europragmatism and 
Euroscepticism. This group last year was presented in the media due the 25th anniversary of the Sąjūdis 
movement. In addition, part of this group participates in formal social movements which will be presented 
later. 
The second group consists of people who are against Europe in principal and who believe that the 
values coming from Europe are bad. For example, we may mention the statement of catholic Archbishop G. 
Grušas from the tribune of Lithuanian parliament when he said that the EU legislation is trying to infiltrate 
our laws and undermine the institution of the family (Šindeikis, 2013).  Therefore, this group is concerned 
about the potential damage of European values to Lithuanian society and tends to be called Eurosceptics. 
The third Eurosceptic group consists of people attempting to find a rational intellectual discourse on 
what Europe should be; what are the challenges for the EU to find a common denominator and go ahead. 
This group is smallest and has no formal movement.  
The main formal social and political movements who tend to express euroscepticism in Lithuania 
are as follows: Lithuanian National Centre (LTC), Lithuanian National Youth Union (LTJS), The citizens 
union For Honesty and the Nation (PSDT), Grunewald National Resistance Movement (ŽNPJ), and the 
right-wing Thought Center - Intellectual Movement (DMC). Their names already show that they all have 
nationalistic ideology and are propagating national sovereignty and values. No special eurosceptic 
movement has been created in Lithuania up to this point. 
Analysis of the information provided in the movements‘ websites as well as interviews with the 
representatives of the movements was performed in order to assess whether the aforementioned 
movements might be attached to Lithuanian euroscepticism. 
The results of interviews11 with the leaders of these movements as well as information provided on 
their internet sites12 show that all the above-mentioned movements tend to express some eurosceptic 
ideas. These movements comprised a minority of Lithuanians against Lithuania‘s membership in the EU in 
2004. Today they question the legitimacy of this referendum due to the changes in referendum law, as well 
                                                     
11  Interview with representatives of Grunewald National Resistance Movement R. Paulauskas and G. Jakavonis 
//http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ER0Xdaig0z4&list=UUbc7lBE5_st-tCscu3iYo8A&index=4&feature=plcp; Interview with 
Ričardas Čekutis. The head of Lithuanian National Centre. Vinius, 2012 03 28. Interview prepared byTautvydas Grinius, VMU 
student.; „Interview with representative of PSDT R. Repšys”. Kaunas,  2012 04 05. Interview prepared by Tautvydas Grinius, 
VMU student.; ―Interview with representative of DMC Linas Kojala―, Vinius. Interview prepared by Tautvydas Grinius, VMU 
student.; „Interview with head of LTJS J. Panka―, Vilnius, 2013 03 28. Interview prepared bythe author.  
12 Lithuanian National Centre :http://www.tautiniscentras.lt/apie-ltc; Lithuanian National Youth Union : 
http://tautosjaunimas.lt/lietuviu-tautinio-jaunimo-sajungos-strategija; The citizens union For Honesty and the Nation : 
http://www.doratauta.lt/index.php?id=2,0,0,1,0,0.; Grunewald National Resistance Movement: 
http://www.zalgiris.org/kategorija/video/. Accessed: 2013 09 25-30. 
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as due to the lack of discussion and the positive campaigning which hindered eurosceptics from presenting 
their opposing arguments (Mažylis and Unikaitė, 2004, Paulauskas, 2013).  
After ten years of Lithuania‘s membership in the EU, these movements are still against 
membership in the EU as it is and talk about the need for reform. A majority of these movements in their 
arguments of skepticism stress that they are against the federalization process of the EU and the attempts 
to form the identity of European citizens by eliminating national identity. They tend to be conditional 
eurosceptics (see Table 1). For instance, the right-wing Thought Center-Intellectual Movement (DMC) calls 
itself a soft eurosceptic movement. They say ―we are eurocritics, eurorealists‖ (Kojala, 2012). The Citizens 
Union For Honesty and the Nation representative says that the EU is the reality and therefore they criticize 
EU politics but are not against the EU as such (Repšys, 2012). The respondents highlight the decline in 
moral values in the EU. As a means of fighting against this decline the movement propagates catholic 
values. Some movements (Lithuanian National Youth Union) also express opposition to federalization. 
They even present their alternative models of the EU, such as ―the community of European nations‖, where 
there is minimal to no bureaucracy and more power is given to national parliaments. This model argues that 
“the integration of the EU is possible only in certain areas like education, culture, and economics” (Panka, 
2012). 
The model confirms the conditional eurosceptic position of the movement, which recognizes the 
significance of European cooperation for Lithuania, but is skeptical of closer European unification. 
Lithuania has examples of both soft and hard euroscepticism. The majority of the movements are 
quite moderate towards the EU, i.e. they are aware of the EU as an inevitable reality from which Lithuania 
cannot escape. These movements are likely to stress that Lithuanians should be more active in promoting 
their interests and are against losing sovereignty. The major reason why these movements are considered 
soft eurosceptics according to P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak‘s model is their aim of seeing the EU different 
from how it is now—not driven from the top, but closer to the European citizenry. Thus these groups, in the 
last instance, do not wish for Lithuania to withdraw from the EU.  
Only one movement takes a truly tough position on the EU: the Grunewald National Resistance 
Movement (ŽNPJ). The leaders of this movement argue that they would not like to see Lithuania in the EU; 
instead they wish Lithuania to be a national state with sovereignty on all issues. They think that Lithuania 
―delivered all the functions of economics, security, and finance to the hands of Brussels‖ (Jakavonis, 2013). 
They even think that ―Lithuania would live better without the EU. Now EU membership is a reality though‖ 
(Paulauskas, 2013). The leaders of this movement, R. Paulauskas and G. Jakavonis, started to write their 
articles in leading news media portals and among other issues the various aspects of euroscepticism are 
very often a topic in their writings.  
 
Table 1.The Types of Euroscepticism of Lithuanian Social Movements 
Name of the movement Soft/hard Europragmatists/ 
Euroenthusiasts/  
Eurosceptics/ 
Eurorejects 
Rejecting/ 
Conditional/ 
Compromising 
Lithuanian National Centre (LTC), soft Eurosceptics Conditional 
Lithuanian National Youth Union (LTJS), soft Eurosceptics Conditional 
The citizens union For Honesty and the Nation (PSDT) soft Eurosceptics Conditional 
Grunewald National Resistance Movement (ŽNPJ), Hard/soft Eurorejects/ 
Eurosceptics 
Conditional 
Right -wing Thought Center - Intellectual Movement 
(DMC). 
soft Eurosceptics Conditional 
Source: prepared by author 
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Lithuanian movements use mostly informative educational means in euroscepticism propagation: 
e.g. cyber strategy (e.g. information presentation in websites), educative publications, conferences, youth 
camps (local, international), and meetings with different people and politicians 13 . These means of 
communication are not particularly successful in attracting public attention. That is why these Eurosceptic 
movements do not have much influence on the masses.  
Analysis of the information on euroscepticism provided by various Lithuanian movements reveals 
that different movements communicate their ideas differently. For instance, the members of the Grunewald 
National Resistance Movement are very active in organizing various discussions with certain experts on EU 
policies and integration aspects, and they present videos of these discussions on youtube.com and their 
website. On their web page there are 20 videos and more than half of them are related to EU issues. The 
discussions critique many mainstream political positions and express eurosceptic arguments. For instance, 
they posted a discussion on the introduction of the euro in Lithuania (Why does Lithuania need the euro 
when the euro is irrelevant for Europe?, 2014)14. This discussion reveals the movement‘s clear resistance 
to deeper EU integration. They argue that the government should present not only positive but also 
negative arguments regarding the euro introduction. 
The Lithuanian National Centre does not aim to discuss various EU policies, but their documents 
(The program of Lithuanian National Centre, 2010) stress several issues which reveal eurosceptic views. 
First, they are against the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and any supranational variants of constitution; 
second, they are for an unlimited moratorium on the introduction of the euro; third, they are against 
propagation of sexual perversions (such as the perceive LGBT to promote); finally, they are against any 
imperialism, including EU imperialism. All of these aims of the movement show a resistance to deeper EU 
integration and dissatisfaction with present EU policies. 
On its website the movement The citizens Union For Honesty and the Nation does not discuss 
anything in particular related to the EU except one issue – they declare that they are against homosexual 
ideology propagation which the EU initiates (About us, 2014). Thus the movement expresses its 
dissatisfaction of EU membership in terms of value orientation and is agitating to fight this EU initiative. 
The Lithuanian National Youth Union has its own website and presents various information portals 
with writing about national, patriotic topics. Direct information on euroscepticism is absent but indirect their 
information shows support for some eurosceptic ideas. Most often the articles discuss the issue of 
homosexuality and its propagation. The documents express the view that Lithuania is for Lithuanians. This 
is a discriminatory and nationalistic position. They post a lot of information about various marches, 
demonstrations and various activities indirectly associated with euroscepticism. 
All of these movements spread their ideas not only through their websites but also in printed 
media. Some of the movements have their own newspapers: for example, Tribūna, and Žalgiris. In the 
newspapers and portals the movements express their opinions on EU integration and other EU policy 
matters. One movement leader, Ričardas Čekutis, works as an editor at the newspaper Respublika. That 
is how he secures some space for eurosceptical articles in one of Lithuania‘s major newspapers.  
The activity of eurosceptics is visible not only in the quantity of information provided but also in 
their involvement in various actions. The major change in euroscepticism visibility, popularity and activity is 
                                                     
13 This we may see in their websites. The information was confirmed y the data from interviews. 
14 Kam Lietuvai reikalingas Europai nebereikalingas euras? (in Lithuanian)/ Why does Lithuania need the euro when the euro is 
irrelevant for Europe? 
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represented by the latest events in 2013-2014. The leaders of nationalistic movements such as Lithuanian 
National Youth Union and Grunewald National Resistance Movement were among the leading organizers 
of the Referendum on the sale of land to foreigners. The initiators of this referendum were Lithuanian 
farmers but nationalist movements were very active supporters and agitators. The issue of land selling was 
related to a very good opportunity to express and propagate euroscepticism among the Lithuanian citizens. 
It is important that the initiative was strongly supported by Lithuanians and more than 300,000 signatures 
supporting the referendum were collected for the first time in Lithuania. At the end of June Lithuania held a 
referendum. All of the major parties were worried about the results of the referendum because positive 
results would be in disagreement with the EU Treaty. However, only around 10% of voters came to express 
their opinion and the referendum failed. Hence, though eurosceptic ideas at points may be attractive, when 
emotional evaluations are faced with rational arguments, Lithuanians tend to be pragmatists.  
What do these trends in eurosceptic movements in Lithuania demonstrate? Though no eurosceptic 
party receives especially significant support from the Lithuanian citizens, the movements that discuss 
certain relevant problems and associate those with the EU requirements can gain support under certain 
circumstances. Lithuanian society is not against the EU; but a significant and growing part of the population 
of Lithuania is inclined to support certain initiatives and contradictions associated with important questions. 
When these questions are associated with EU requirements, there is now the serious possibility that 
negative evaluations of the EU itself will be the result of addressing these questions. 
 
 
9. Reasons for the Presence of Euro–Optimism and the Potential of Euroscepticism in Lithuania  
Lithuania tends to be a euro-optimistic country, with no strong eurosceptic parties, social 
movements and public attitudes. We may list a number of reasons for support of EU membership among 
Lithuanians. First, Lithuanians tend to be pragmatists. A whole decade of membership convinced the 
people about membership benefits: e.g. financial support and funding from various European funds, and 
free movement in and among the EU countries with various possibilities for work, studies and travel. 
Second, among the reasons to support EU membership we may list Lithuanians‘ memories of their 
historical past: e.g. the occupation of Lithuania, Lithuania‘s membership in the Soviet Union, the threat of 
Russia, the geopolitical situation in general, etc. Lithuanians still feel threatened by Russia, and in this 
respect they think that it is better to lose some sovereignty by integrating with EU institutions while still 
maintaining a free and independent state. Third, Lithuanians experience many economic benefits offered 
by the EU common market. While euro-optimism prevails in Lithuania, we cannot avoid eurosceptic 
attitudes. 
As previously noted, the people do not tend to vote for eurosceptics, but the ―political and 
psychological climate and the way of people‘s thinking is affected not only by the election results but by the 
public speeches of intellectuals as well. It may take a long time but the so called marginal groups may 
convince the people that everything is bad in Lithuania‖ (Šindeikis, 2013) This is why we cannot say that we 
need not pay attention to their thoughts and discussions and treat the movements and various eurosceptic 
politicians as marginal figures without a future. 
There are several possible reasons why euroscepticism still finds expression in a very euro-
optimistic Lithuania. Historian A. Kasparavičius gives three basic explanations. Firstly, Lithuanian history 
influences some eurosceptics who remember that Lithuanians were among the last Christianized in 
Europe, having shown strong resistance to belonging to any union, fighting with crusaders, etc. Secondly, 
populism is supported in Lithuanian politics and populists use various strategies, among them 
euroscepticism; in Lithuania eurosceptic ideas are associated with populism. Thirdly, there is a difference in 
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the people‘s behavior—i.e. Lithuanians differ from Western Europeans. Lithuanians still seem to harbor 
some fears of something like Europe, which looks unknown and alien (Šindeikis, 2013). Thus, motivated by 
such fears, Lithuanians are more likely to support nationalistic and eurosceptic ideas.  
Euroscepticism and populism is popular among those states which do not understand what role 
their country may play in the EU. Lithuania is no exception to this. Some groups of society really do not 
have a clear vision. They might be a potential source for euroscepticism. The analysis of eurosceptic ideas 
shows that euroscepticism in Lithuania appears in the form of questioning future EU projects that are not 
(apparently) based on values, but which, from the eurosceptic perspective, should be.  
Despite the manifestation of euroscepticism in Lithuania during the last years, genuinely strong 
support of eurosceptic parties and movements is not likely to appear in the near future. There has always 
been and likely always will be a group of Lithuanians critical towards the EU; but it is unlikely that 
eurosceptics will become a numerous and significant political force in Lithuania. 
 
 
10. Conclusion 
This article provides empirical analysis of euroscepticism in the case of Lithuania, by applying the 
dominant theoretical division of euroscepticism into its soft and hard variants, and interpreting the four-type 
euroscepticism model presented by Kopecky and Mudde together with the third classification presented by 
Sophia Vasilopoulou. The analysis of public euroscepticism, party-based euroscepticism and social 
movement-based euroscepticism has revealed that there is no hard line euroscepticism in Lithuania among 
all of the three actors analyzed. They may all be classified as soft eurosceptics. The public, parties and 
movements already acknowledge that Lithuania‘s membership in the EU is a reality and no one questions 
it. Even the Grunewald National Resistance Movement acknowledges this, and it is one of the hardest of 
the soft eurosceptic movements. All of the efforts of Lithuanian eurosceptics are focused on criticizing the 
policies and future deepening of integration \ in the EU. The eurosceptic parties and movements tend to 
oppose the EU's current and planned projects based on the further extension of the competencies of EU 
institutions. 
The paper reveals that Lithuania tends to be a euro-optimistic country where soft euroscepticism 
has the potential to grow. Although eurosceptic parties are not supported in the elections, public opinion 
polls and public support for some initiatives presented by eurosceptic groups and movements (last 
referendum initiative) indicate that euroscepticism is not absent in society and under certain conditions may 
even move off the margins of Lithuanian politics slightly more towards the center.  
There are several possible reasons why euroscepticism was not supported in the elections for a 
long time, and remains unpopular among the public. First, though we may notice intensification of 
euroscepticism in the EU countries, it is still not highly supported in Western European countries and 
Lithuania is not an exception. Second, there is no eurosceptic party in the (Lithuanian) parliament. The 
nationalist parties expressing euroscepticism are incapable ideologically of competing with the major 
parties that also pretend to get votes from eurosceptics by talking about EU membership and aims to 
change the EU by being a part of the union (e.g. anti-elite parties like Order and Justice use this strategy). 
Third, weak institutionalization of social movements and lack of coordination of their activities, together with 
ignorance of eurosceptics in the mainstream media (except for the newspaper Respublika), do not allow 
the people to get more information and get involved in the expression and spread of euroscepticism. 
Fourth, open hostility to the EU is not compatible with the majority of Lithuanian voters‘ interests – 
Lithuanians already know the advantages of the common EU market, free labor force movement, 
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Schengen agreement, and EU structural funds. Accordingly, people may express criticisms among 
themselves and in the polls, but they will not vote for the parties arguing against the EU. Finally, 
euroscepticism in Lithuania very often is associated with the influence of the East (i.e. Russia). With 
memories of Soviet times still fresh, people are afraid of again coming under the direct influence of Russia. 
In sum, one can state that eurosceptics are marginalized in Lithuanian politics for the reasons 
listed above. However, certain important and widely relevant issues, coupled with the mainstream political 
parties‘ inability to communicate with the public in a clear way about their decisions related to EU 
membership requirements, could potentially unite these otherwise marginalized eurosceptics voices. If this 
happens, eurosceptics in Lithuania may in fact have the chance to participate in mainstream politics.  
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